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LOPEZ-MENDOZA Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the CA9's ruling that the 
exclusionary rule applies to deportation proceedings. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: This petn involves two 
cases that were consolidated on appeal before the CA9. Both 
cases involve d~po~QD p roceepings in which an illegal alien 
sought to suppress the use in their deportation proceeding of 
f 
? 
, Resp Sandoval was apprehended in 1977 at his place of 
employment, a potato processing plant in Pasco, Washington. The 
search of the plant was not authorized by warrant, but the INS 
officers had permission from the company officials to question 
some of the company employees. The officials stationed 
themselves at the entrance to the main work area during a change 
of shift. As employees walked past, they questioned those that 
looked suspicious. Those who the officers wanted to question in 
greater detail were detained in a restroom and cleanup area. 
Resp Sandoval was among those detained. There is no evidence in 
the record of whether he was questioned further in the restroom. 
Eventually, however, 37 aliens who had been detained in the 
restroom, including Sandoval, were transported to the Franklin 
County Jail and processed in the training room of the local 
~ police department. Those who wished to depart for Mexico 
' 
voluntarily were placed on a bus leaving that day. Those who 
demanded a deportation hearing, including Sandoval, were 
questioned further; during this questioning Sandoval admitted 
that he had entered the country unlawfully, and his admission was 
reduced to writing. At a hearing before an immigration law 
judge, Sandoval contended that he had been seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. The judge rejected that claim, finding 
that Sandoval's "furtive" behavior and "foreign appearance" were 
sufficient to give rise to a suspicion of alienage. 
Resp Lopez was arrested in 1976 at his place of 
employment, an automobile transmission repair shop. Two 
immigration officers went to the shop, apparently on a tip that 
they would find seven illegal aliens employed there. Resp 
Lopez's name was not one of the seven names on their list. The 
officers identified themselves to the proprietor of the shop and 
asked if they could talk to his employees. The proprietor 
refused, but the officers nevertheless proceeded to question resp 
Lopez. In response to questioning by the officers, Lopez 
admitted that he was from Mexico and had no close family ties in 
the United States. The officers took him into custody. 
Both an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals found Lopez deportable. Both rejected claims by Lopez 
that he had been arrested illegally, because each concluded that 
an unlawful arrest had no bearing on subsequent deportation 
proceedings. 
The CA9 reversed Sandoval's deportation order and 
~ vacated and remanded Lopez's deportation order. Six panel 
members, in an opinion written by Judge Norris, held that 
Sandoval's admission was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and 
that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the evidence. 
Judge Goodwin concurred separately. In reaching its decision, 
the majority applied the analysis set forth in United States v. 
Janis, 428 u.s. 433 {1976). The court first examined the 
connection between those who illegally obtained the evidence and 
those that seek to use it in a subsequent proceeding. The court 
observed that not only are the officers and prosecutors members 
of the same government agency, but they also share a common goal 
and purpose. For this reason, the deterrent effect of the 
' exclusionary sanction would be great. The court also concluded 
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that alternative checks on agency activity were not adequate to 
deter the activity. The court then analyzed the costs of 
applying the exclusionary rule. It concluded that the number of 
aliens that would request suppression hearings and the number 
that would win them would be very small. Until Matter of 
Sandoval (no relation to resp), 17 I.&N. Dec. 70, (1979) the INS 
had assumed that the exclusionary rule applied in deportation 
proceedings; between 1952 and 1979 fewer than fifty Fourth 
Amendment challenges to the introduction of evidence had been 
raised. App. 52a. The court concluded that such a mi~scule 
burden on the INS was a small price to pay for the deterrent 
effects that the exclusionary rule would create. 
Judge Alarcon wrote the principal dissent, a 45-page 
statement arguing that there was nothing in the record from which 
~ it could reasonably be inferred that immigration officers 
' 
routinely conduct unreasonable searches and seizures. He also 
argued that there were no "facts that would support an inference 
that extending the exclusionary rule to civil deportation 
proceedings would act as a significant deterrent to present INS 
practices." App. 46a. Hence, he was of the view that the 
majority had "created a remedy for which there is no demonstrated 
need." Ibid. On the cost side, the principal dissent noted that, 
under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" concept, suppression 
could immunize an alien perpetually from deportation despite his 
continuing violation of the immigration laws. Moreover, the 
dissent noted that requiring suppression hearings in deportation 
proceedings "could result in protracted interruption of the 
I 
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proceedings, and may seriously impede enforcement of our nation's 
immigration laws." App. at 72a. The dissent therefore took 
issue with the majority's claim that application of the 
exclusionary rule would not significantly increase the number of 
illegal aliens allowed to remain in the United States. Finally, 
the dissent was of the view that INS's procedures for 
disciplining officers who conduct illegal searches and seizures 
made application of the exclusionary rule to deportation 
proceedings unnecessary. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG makes several arguments. He 
firs ~notes that the exclusionary rule is particularly 
inappropriate in deportation proceedings because when an illegal 
alien is allowed to remain in the United States, there is an 
o~going violation of law. This factor distinguishes deportation 
proceedings from other proceedings where the prosecution is for a 
past and completed act. The rest of the SG's arguments are to 
the effect that the CA9 simply miscalculated the costs and 
benefits of applying the rule. He argues that the result of the 
rule will be to allow many illegal aliens to remain in the 
country indefinitely. 
In addition, the effect of the rule will be to change 
drastically the nature of deportation proceedings, which are 
designed to be summary in nature. The availability of 
suppression hearings will provide an illegal alien with a means 
to delay his deportation, and drastically slow the processing of 
aliens, which currently takes place very rapidly. INS officers 
will now also be forced to try and remember precisely the 
' ) 
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circumstances surrounding each decision to detain someone in 
order to be able to respond to suppression motions. This burden 
is unworkable, given that arrests of illegal aliens often occur 
in large groups, with an individual officer responsible for 
several arrests on a given day. This process is very different 
from the process of a policeman enforcing the criminal law, in 
which there is generally a very specific target of an 
investigation and the number of arrests by any individual officer 
is relatively small. Thus, the SG claims that application of the 
exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings threatens to 
undermine the enforcement efforts of the INS just at a time when 
the problem of illegal aliens is at its worst. 
The response argues that the government 
I mischaracterizes the significance of the CA9 decision. There is 
~ no conflict among the circuits. The only other circuit to 
' 
consider the issue in recent times concluded that the 
exclusionary rule did apply, Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F.2d 166 
(CAl 1977). Moreover, prior to Matter of Sandoval, 17 1. & N. 
Dec. at 80 (1979), the understanding of the INS had always been 
that the exclusionary rule was applicable in deportation 
proceedings. The long history of successful INS enforcement of 
immigration laws despite the application of the exclusionary rule 
belies the government's predicition of a parade of horribles. 
The fact that the government's argument is all based on 
predictions of the future effect of the rule when for years it 
applied to their proceedings is evidence of the fact that the 
government's fears are all exagerated. 
I 
( 
Moreover, the government mischaracterizes the effect of 
the application of the rule on an alien's ability. to remain in 
this country. Application of the rule does not indefinitely 
immunize an illegal alien from deportation. He remains subject 
to deportation based on untainted evidence, and can be arrested 
and deported at any time based upon untainted evidence. 
The government is also wrong in its claim that 
application of the rule will result in numerous suppression 
hearings that will change the summary nature of deportation 
proceedings. Regardless of the application of the exclusionary 
rule, an alien has a right to a hearing on the issue of 
deportability, and that hearing must comport with Fifth Amendment 
guarantees of due process. Accordingly, an alien that wishes to 
obstruct the summary nature of deportation can already do so by 
exercising his right to such a hearing. That right has not in 
the past caused significant delay in the process. There is no 
reason to suspect that the availability of a suppression hearing 
will add significantly to the delay. As for the feasibility of 
other forms of deterrence, they are all desirable and reasonable, 
but they are better seen as ways to supplement the effectiveness 
of the exclusionary rule. 
4. DISCUSSION: The issue in this case is undoubtedly 
controversial, as evidenced by the CA9's decision to hear the 
c~c, the long opinions by the majority and dissent, and 
the SG's strong urging that this Court hear it. 
little to add. I do not think 
that the SG's dark predicitions about the effect of the rule 
provide a very strong response to respondent's point that for 
years the exclusionary rule was assumed to apply to deportation 
~--------~--~--------------- ----- -----
proceedings, and there is no evidence that it was a significant , ____ _ 
burden ddring that time. The majority opinion notes, and neither 
the dissent nor the SG dispute, that since 1952 there has been a 
total of fewer than fifty fourth Amendment challenges to the 
---------admissibility of evidence in deportation proceedings. I find 
this statistic suprising, given that until 1979 the INS applied 
the exclusionary rule to its own proceedings. The majority 
opinion explains the statistic by pointing out that the vast 
majority of illegal aliens that are arrested leave the country 
voluntarily; they have an incentive to do so because once a 
person has been deported it is a felony to reenter the country. 
The SG offers no other explanation for the few instances in which 
~ aliens have brought Fourth Amendment challenges in the past. 
Instead, the SG ignores entirely the past experiences of the INS 
operating under the exclusionary rule, and makes a series of dire 
predictions of how the rule will operate in the future. It is my 
guess, therefore, that the SG is exagerating the importance of 
the CA9 decision. 
The respondent is also correct that there is not a 
split in the circuits on the issue. Moreover, because under 
Janis the determinat1on of whether to apply the rule involves a 
cost-benefit calculus, it may be desirable to let the INS operate 
under the rule for a while in order to develop some empirical 
evidence on its current effect. Nevertheless, the Court may want 
to hear this case simply because it is a question of first 
.· 
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impression in this Court, and the government clearly wants it 
heard. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I have no recommendation. 
There is a response. 
December 13, 1983 Bartlett opn in petn 
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Cammie R. Robinson INS v. Lopez & Sandoval April 11, 1984 
Question Presented 
Whether the exclusionary rule applies in deportation 
hearings. 
FACTS & PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The facts are relatively unimportant here as the 4th 
Amendment violation is not at issue. The only question is 
~ - "'--- -- ----------:::: 
whether the exclusionary rule of the 4th Amendment applies in 
deportation hearings to exclude evidence seized as a result of an 
illegal arrest. CA9 in a divided en bane decision held that it 
DISCUSSION 
The deportation proceedings at issue here are entirely 
civil in nature. See Woodby v. INS, 385 u.s. 276, 285 (1966); -
Fonq Yue Ting v. United States, 149 u.s. 698, 730 (1893). This 
Court has never applied the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule to ~ 
-~ --- - .. ~11" 
su~ngs. United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 447 
(1976) • 1 The SG does not argue that the exclusionary rule shoulo 
never apply to civil proceedings. He argues only that its 
application in deportation hearings will not further deterrence 
sufficiently to outweigh its social costs. 2 Respondents take the 
1The Court has applied the exclusionary 
proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. 
v. Pennsylvania, 380 u.s. 693 (1965). 
rule to civil 
See One Plymouth Sedan 
2so far dicta in one of this Court's decisions, United States 
ex rel. Bribkumsky v. Tod, 263 u.s. 149, 155 (1923) (semble), an 
opinion of one of the federal CAs, Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 
F.2d 166, 169 (CAl 1977), and several scholarly treatises have 
) indicated that the exclusionary rule applies in deportation 
)Proceedings. See, e.g., Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law & 
Footnote continued on next page. 
. .. 
contrary view. The dispute, therefore, is over the proper 
--··----~  
balance between the benefits of deterrence and the social costs 
----------- --· of exclusion in the context of deportation hearings. The two 
~-
controlling cases are Janis, 428 u.s. 447 (1976), and your Court 
opinion in ~ited States v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 338 (1974). In 
both cases, the Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in 
the particular contexts at issue. 3 The balancing analysis 
articulated in those two opinions, however, suggests that the 
exclusionary rule may be applicable in deportation hearings. 1 
The first step is to identify those whose conduct is to 
be deterred and to determine whether exclusion is likely to 
deter. Thereafter, several principles apply. First, exclusion 
of relevant evidence generally is unwarranted when "[i]t falls 
outside the offending official's zone of primary interest." 
Janis, 428 u.s., at 458. In Janis, the exclusionary rule was 
urged to deter the conduct of state criminal law enforcement 
officals by excluding evidence from federal civil proceedings. 
The Court reasoned that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary 
rule in that case was too attenuated to justify its social costs. 
Id. Such is not the case here. The INS officials who made the 
illegal arrests wen/ 'pr imar i ly responsible for gathering evidence 
Procedure §5.2.c, at 5-31 (1980). 
3In Janis, the Court held that the exclusionary rule would not 
apply to exclude evidence obtained by a state criminal law 
enforcement officer from a federal civil tax proceeding. In 
Calandra, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply 
to grand jury proceedings. 
to secure the deportation of illegal aliens. Exclusion of the 
tainted evidence in this case, therefore, falls within "the 
offending official's zone of primary interest. 
Second, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is 
'---·----·- -·-· 
gteate~ where it is the primary deterrent. The Court concluded 
that exclusion was unnecessary in Janis because the state 
official whose conduct was to be controlled already was deterred 
by the exclusion of evidence in state criminal proceedings, and 
by the exclusion of evidence in federal criminal proceedings. 
Janis, 428 u.s., at 448. The Court held that "the additional 
marginal deterrence" achieved by excluding the evidence from the 
federal civil proceedings was not worth the social cost entailed. 
Id • , at 4 53 • 4 This case is distinguishable. Here, the illegal 
__,...._____·---------::=--. 
evidence was obtained solely with an eye toward deportation. The 
likelihood that it would be used in subsequent criminal 
proceedings was small, see Cert. Pet., at 24a, and of little 
concern to the INS officials who committed the violations. Thus, 
exclusion in other ·proceedings will do little to deter the 
conduct at issue here. Exclusion in deportation proceedings, on 
the other hand, may deter a great deal. The SG's argument that 
--------------------~'-
4rn Calandra, the Court held that exclusion of evidence from 
grand jury proce~dings would not significantly further deterrence 
because the evidence would be · excluded from any subsequent 
criminal trial on the merits. The Court reasoned that law 
enforcement officials would have no incentive to violate the 
Fourth Amendment to obtain evidence that would be admissible only 
in grand jury proceedings, but that would be unavailable to 
obtain a conviction. 414 u.s:, at 351. Here, by contrast the 




similarly effective, but less drastic, means of deterrence are 
available is unpersuasive. 
The SG relies on the availability of injunctive relief, 
Bivens suits, and internal disciplinary measures. Injunctive 
relief may be obtained only after significant constitutional 
violations have taken place, and only if the plaintiff can 
demonstrate standing --no easy task after~s Angeles v. Lyons, 
103 s.ct. 1660 (1983). 5 It is unrealistic to expect those most 7~ 
likely to be detained in connection with deportation proceedings 
to have the legal knowledge or the financial means to initiate 
Bivens actions. Finally, the SG's reliance on internal 
disciplinary measures has been rejected in other contexts, and 
there is no reason to believe the INS is any more capable of 
effective self-discipline than other law enforcement agencies. 6 
5Moreover, injunctive relief may pose greater administrative 
headaches for INS officials than the simple exclusionary rule. 
6The SG makes much of the INS' "comprehensive" internal 
disciplinary procedures. See SG's Br., at 41-46. An INS agent 
who misbehaves "'may be subject to agency disciplinary action 
with possible penalties ranging from an official letter of 
reprimand to removal from his . job."' Id., at 43 (quoting INS, 
u.s. Dept. Justice, The Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure for 
Immigration Officers 35 (Jan. 1983). The SG argues that the fact 
that 20 INS agents have been suspended or terminated in the past 
4 years for civil ri~hts violations indicates that agency self-
discipline is effective. Resp's Brief points out that of the 11 
agents who were terminated because of INS disciplinary action, 3 
were terminated for rapes of aliens; 3 for assaults on federal 
undercover officers posing as aliens; 2 for physically abusing 
and causing injury to detained aliens; 2 for physically abusing 
detainees; 1 for physically abusing a Mexican national applying 
for admission. Resps' Br., at 60 n. 42. The INS report Resps 
have lodged with the Clerk documents this. No information is 
given on the other 9 agents whom the SG states have been subject 
to milder discplinary measures. 
The SG argues that the social costs attending 
application of the exclusionary rule to deportation hearings far 
outweigh the benefits. The SG identifies the following costs: 
1. Exclusion of evidence may enable an illegal alien to 
remain in this country. The exclusionary rule thus countenances 
continuing illegal conduct. In contrast, exclusion of evidence 
in a criminal trial merely allows a criminal to escape punishment 
for past crimes. SG's Br., at 24-26. I find this argument 
unpersuasive. One hardly could argue that there is a greater 
social cost from allowing an illegal alien to remain in this 
country than from allowing a murderer to go free. 
2. Envocation of the exclusionary rule will complicate 
otherwise simple deportation hearings. Deportation hearings must 
be completed quickly to deal with the vast numbers of illegal 
aliens. Forcing the hearing officers to resolve constitutional 
questions they are not qualified to resolve will prolong the 
already overburdened process. Moreover, once it is known that 
the exclusionary rule is available, aliens who otherwise would 
have left the country voluntarily will demand a hearing and 
allege 4th Amendment violations. SG's Br., at 26-31. The 
numbers of illegal aliens entering this country and the number of 
deportation hearings held each year is staggering. Nevertheless, 
I find the SG's argument unpersuasive for several reasons. 
First, the INS uniformly applied the exclusionary rule to ---deportation hearings until 1979 with no apparent adverse 
co~ Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (Aug. 






rule does not apply). In that case, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals [BIA] itself observed: 
"It might be presumed that '[the societal] costs' [of 
the exclusionary rule] would be minimal in view of the 
fact that since 1899 we can find only two reported 
cases in which unlawfully seized evidence was in fact 
excluded from deportation proceedings and only one 
other case in which appliCfbility of [the] rule was 
addressed." J.A., at 177. 
Second, CA9 explained that most illegal aliens do not demand a 
deportation hearing, but choose to leave the country voluntarily. 
Cert. Pet., at 29a. This is largely because those who are 
deported following formal deportation proceedings are subject to 
tough constraints on any legal reentry they may make, and illegal 
reentry after formal deporation constitutes a felony. 8 u.s.c. 
§1326. 8 
3. Application of the exclusionary rule will require INS 
agents to modify their enforcement techniques. Under current 
practice, a small number of INS agents are able to roundup large 
numbers of illegal aliens. (E.g. factory surveys, see Delgado, 
No. 82-1271). If these agents later are required to prove that 
7since 1952, 4th Amendment challenges to the introduction of 
evidence has been made in fewer than 50 BIA proceedings. See 
Cert. Pet., at 28a. 
8Even if these incentives for waiving a hearing were not 
sufficient to curb the envocation of the exclusionary rule, 
absence of legal counsel would be. Most undocumented aliens are 
not represented by counsel and are unfamiliar with their legal 
rights. The alien's right to counsel in civil deportation 
proceedings extends only to counsel retained at no expense to the 
government. See 8 u.s.c. §1252(b) (2): 8 C.F.R. §292.1. Thus, 
there is little reason to suspect that the exclusionary rule will 
become as popular with illegal aliens as it is with criminals. 
bench memo: INS v. Lopez & Sandoval, No. 83-491 page 8 
probable cause existed for any subsequent arrests, they would 
have to "compile detailed, contemporaneous, written reports 
recording the circumstances of each individual arrest." SG's 
Br., at 33. Moreover, INS agents would be forced to attend any 
deportation hearing in which a 4th Amendment violation was 
alleged. Id., at 31-33. Again, I find the SG's arguments 
unpersuasive. First, none of these horribles existed prior to 
1979 when the exclusionary rule was thought applicable to 
deportation hearings. Second, I don't think it outrageous to 
require INS agents to show they had probable cause to arrest an ------···------.--....--......._---------..._ ~-----~--... ----~------------
illegal alien. The factory surveys are not arrests, but more 
like Terry stops. No one suggests in this case that these must 
stop. In sum, I do not believe that the SG has shown that the 
I 
social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to deporation 
hearings are especially horrendous. 9 
On the other side of the balance, the SG argues that 
"there is no evidence of widespread Fourth Amendment violations 
by immigration officers," and thus that Resps have not 
demonstrated any need for envocation of the exclusionary rule in 
deportation hearings. SG's Br., at 34-39. There are two answers 
to that argument. First, the exclusionary rule applied until 
1979 and presumably deterred 4th Amendment violations. Second, 
'----- I .)-;nv ~ 
IA..k. ~. 
9Indeed, in his reply brief, the SG refutes his position that 
the exclusionary rule will force a modification of INS techniques 
by arguing that the exclusionary rule will have no deterrent 
effect because INS agents a~e more concerned with the number of 
arrests they make rather than the constitutional validity of 
those arrests. See Reply Br., at 13. 
). 
since 1979 the INS has followed a conservative policy in 
conducting search and seizures because it is uncertain whether 
this Court will apply the exclusionary rule to deportation 
hearings. 1° Fourth Amendment violations may increase once it is 
clear that the exclusionary rule does not apply. 
Resps argue that application of the exclusionary rule 
will confer substantial social benefits. The rule is not as 
important, resps argue, to the protection of illegal aliens as to 
the protection of the constitutional rights of our minority 
citizens who share racial, ethnic, and linguistic characteristics 
with the targets of immigration searches. Ethnic characteristics 
already are considered relevant factors in determining the 
reasonableness of an investigatory stop of minimal intrusiveness. 
See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 873, 886-887 
(1975). Absent the exclusionary rule, INS agents may feel free 
to base "probable cause" almost entirely on such characteristics. 
See, e.g., Resps' Br., at 97 nn. 81, 82 (describing examples of 
careless arrests and deportations based merely on ethnic 
appearance). This argument is appealing. It may be, however, 
that legal residents are distinguished from likely illegal aliens 
10 The Search & Seizure Manual for INS agents provides: 
"Many of these areas of the law are in flux and have 
not yet been settled by the Supreme Court •••• In these 
areas, the Service ••• adopts a ••• policy which does 
not test the limit of the ••• Constitution •••• If our 
policy is ••. more restrictive than the Constitutional 
limit, ••• where that limit has not yet been determined 
by the Supreme Court, our officers are less likely to 
be involved in litigation over alleged violations of 
persons' Constitutional rights." SG's Br., at 41. 
bench memo: INS v. Lopez & Sandoval, No. 83-491 page 10 
during the investigatory stops and therefore generally will not 
be subject to a 4th Amendment "seizure." 
Resps' weakest argument is perhaps the most crucial to 
their cause. Some of the factors I mentioned in refuting the 
~
SG's position also suggest that the exclusionary rule will not 
have a significant deterrent effect in this context: 
1. Although the exclusionary rule applied in theory until 
1979, it was envoked successfully only three times in 76 years. 
~ 
It is hardly likely that such an infrequently used rule exerts 
much of a deterrent effect. 
2. As the SG points out, INS agents are more concerned with 
the "quality of apprehensions ••• than their quality under 
constitutional standards." Reply Br., at 13. This is because 
most illegal aliens who are apprehended leave voluntarily, or are 
without the legal or financial means to envoke the rule. Because 
apprehension is ususally all that is necessary for a successful 
deportation, the exclusionary rule is unlikely to deter any 
"constitutional short cuts" INS agents may take. This is an 
unattractive but practical argument. In sum, the exclusionary 
rule may not have a significant deterrent effect. 
CONCLUSION 
The SG's argument that application of the exclusionary 
rule to deportation hearings will wreak havoc with the system is 
unconvincing. On the other hand, the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule in deportation hearings is dubious. I suspect 
? ? 
I _, 
bench memo: INS v. Lopez & Sandoval, No. 83-491 page 11 -
the Court will not choose this case to extend the exclusionary 
rule for the first time to a civil proceeding. As a practical 
matter, this may not tempt an increase in 4th Amendment 
violations. However, it may be an unattractive opinion to write. 
,. 
'· .,, ' 
April 13, 1984 
INS GINA-POW 
83-491 INS v. Mendoza and Sandovol Sanchez 
Memo to file 
This is the third case this Term involving illegal 
aliens, and the second case involving efforts of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to identify 
and deport - or permit voluntarily to leave the country -
illegal aliens. 
The question presented is straightforward, important, 
and - at least for me at this time - not difficult to 
answer. As framed by the SG the question is: 
"Whether the 
exclusionary rule should 
deportation proceedings? 
Fourth Amendment's 
be extended to civil 
In both cases, consolidated by CA9, INS agents 
questioned persons in their places of employment who 
appeared to be Mexicans. 
CA9 's opinion focused primarily on Sandovol 's case. 
Officers entered the plant he without a 
search warrant ut with permission from company officials. 
The facts of the case are quite similar to the case WHR 
has written for the Court, and in which I have filed a 
2. 
separate concurring opinion. Officers entered the plant 
and questioned employees, while other officers guarded the 
exits. Thirty-seven aliens, who had been "detained in the 
\ men's room" whom the officers wished to interrogate 
following initial questions, were transferred to the 
county jail and questioned further while in custody there. 
CA9 doubted that there had been the "requisite 
individualized suspicion of illegal alienage to justify 
even a brief _____ of San ") Pet ion 7 A) • CA9 did 
not decide the case on that issue, however, for it viewed 
the "dispositive question" to be the unlawful detention 
"at the time he was interrogated in jai 1. By that time, 
the initial stop had "r ippened into an arrest". Citing 
Dunaway. 
CA9 recognized that: 
"The question of the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is 
one of first impression in this circuit." (Pet. 
9a) • 
CA9 cited United States ex rel, Bilokumsky 
v • Tod , 2 6 3 U. S • 14 9 , 15 5 , as one in w h i c h the 
Court "assunmed" that evidence obtained in an 
illegal search and seizure could not be the 
basis of a finding in a deportation proceeding. 
CA9 concluded, however, that this Court had 
never expressed a view on the specific issue. 
It was said by CA9, however, that the "few 
federal cases which have squarely confronted the 
question have all held that evidence illegally 
\'t, .. ,, 
"' 
obtained by federal agents is inadmissible in 
subsequent deportation proceedings". 
The dissent by Judge Alarcon took a very 
different view: 
"Today the majority has extended the 
exclusionary rule to teh' suppression of oral 
statements in civil ~portation proceedings. 
None of the cases relied upon by the majority 
support this radical departure from existing 
law." 
"In 1886, the United States Supreme Court 
first applied the exclusionary rule in Boyd v. 
United States, 116 u.s. 616 (1886). Since that 
date our highest Court has never apElieg the 
eclusionary rule lfb_a civil proceeding. The 
Court~ has Hmtt-ett appficatron of" Erre rule to 
criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings". 
3. 
The SG does not contest the illegality of the 
questioning, at least at the jailhouse. Rather, he argues 
that this would be the first time the exclusionary rule 
has ever been extended to a civil proceeding, and argues 
at length the adverse effect of such an extension would 
have upon the enforcement of our immigration laws. It is 
conceded that the Fourth Amendment extends to deportable 
aliens, but argues inappropriateness of "permitting 
illegal aliens to invoke 
deportation proceedings 
the exclus_tnary rule in civil 
in order -~ perpetuate their 







k> ~ ~~· 
The argumentdf:1:!:: ~e~ the Jpi;,o~  
the exclusionary rule, e¥eft in criminal cases,~o ~er~ ' -~ 
unlawful police conduct. The same policy considerations, 
according to the SG, do not apply to the INS agents whose 
duty it is to identify and detain persons believed to be 
illegal aliens, affording them the opportunity voluntarily 
to return to their native country or to have deportation 
.___ ..-.. z:::; 
hearings. 
Both of the aliens involved in this case chosef to 
have hearings. The administrative judges in both cases 
ruled against the aliens, as did the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. 
Among the "societal costs of extending the 
exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings", the SG 
argues that the "exclusion of oral admissions of aliens is 
likely to result in a ____ grant of residence status 
and immunity from the immigration law to persons not 
entitled to be in this country." 
Respondents brief, submitted by the ACLU, is 
confusing because it appears to argues that until 1979, 
the exclusionary rule was uniformly applied "to the 
enforcement of immigration laws". 
"Given the long history of applying a rule 
of exciusion in deportation proceedings, and the 
pressures for enhanced enforcement now faced by 
INS, abandonment of the rule at this time 
without the existence of equally effective 
alternatives will inevitrably lead to an "open 
season" on Hispanic Americans, resulting in tfie 
who3::esa~ "VH5l:'atlol'i' 'O'f F'ourth Amendment rights 
based on racial or ethnic appearance. Balancing 
the societal costs of exclusion against the harm 
to the rights of Hispanic Americans which would 
flow from the loss of the rule 1 s substantial 
deterrent impact on INS misconduct, this rule 
must be applied in deportation proceedings." 
5. 
The brief, in rarely intemperate language, argues 
that the government 1 s position would effect gravely the 
"rights of those citizens who share racial, ethnic and 
linguistic characteristics" that make them the targets of 
immigration searches. Brief 19. 
be 
* * * 
Although in theory, there is 
said for CA9 1 s holding. If 
,...,-~..,--~,_~so~~ 
Fourt Amendment 
applies to aliens, the exclusionary rule certainly would 
protect them in a criminal proceedings. The question 
therefore, is whether the rationale of the rule applies 
with equal force in a civil proceedings. I am inclined to 
think not. 
LFP, JR. 
' I ~·,• 
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REME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
-12 
No. 83-491 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ~~ 
PETITIONER v. ADAN LOPEZ-MENDOZA ~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ~ ~ 
APPEALS FO~ THE NINTH CIRCUIT d_ j ?_. 
[May-, 1984] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This litigation requires us to decide whether an admission 
of unlawful presence in this country made8ubsequ'-~n__,.t--,ti-o-an 
a ~W~I~es must e excluded as e viaence in a 
ivil~ ing. We ho a a e exclusionary 
rule need not be applied in such a proceeding. 
I 
Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-
Sanchez, both citizens of Mexico, were summoned to separate 
deportation proceedings. in California and Washington, and 
both were ordered deEorted. They challenged the regular-
ity of those proceedings on grounds related to the lawfulness 
of their respective arrests by officials of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). On dmini~ati~~the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an agency of the De-
partment of Justice, affirmed theaeportation orders. 
The Court of Appea s or e m 1rcuit, sitting en 
bane, reversed Sandoval's deportation order and vacated and 
remanded Lopez's deportation-order. 705 F. -2d 1059 (1983). 
It ruled that Sandoval's admission of his illegal presence in 
this country was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and that the 
exclusionary rule applied in a deportation proceeding. Lo-
pez s e ortat10n or er was vacate an IS case remanded to 
the BIA to determine whether the Fourth Amendment had 
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been violated in the course of his arrest. We granted certio-
rari, -- U. S. --. 
A 
Respondent Lopez was arrested in 1976 by INS agents at 
his place of emploYil!ent, a transmission repair shop in San ............ 
Mateo California. Responding to a tip, INS investigators 
arrived at the shop shortly before 8 a. m. The agents had 
not sought a warrant to search the premises or to arrest any 
of ITS oc~The proprietor of the shop firmly refused 
to allow the agents to interview his employees during work-
ing hours. Nevertheless, while one agent engaged the pro-
prietor in conversation another entered the shop and ap-
proached Lopez. In response to the agent's questioning, 
Lopez gave his name and m icated that he was om Mexico 
witn no c1o~ 1es m e · e es. e agent 
thenpracea him under arrest. Lopez unde~t ~er 
questioning at INS offices, where he ~dmitt~e was born in 
MexiCO,~liacit'izen of Mexico, and had entered this 
country without inspection by immigration authorities. 
Based on his answers, the agents prepared a "Record of De-
portable Alien" (Form I-213), and an affidavit which Lopez 
executed, admitting his Mexican nationality and his illegal 
entry into this country. 
A hearing was held before an immigration judge. Lopez's 
counsel moved to terminate the proceeding on the ground 
that Lopez had been arrested illegally. The judge ruled that 
the le~lity of the arrest was not relevanLto t~tion 
procee ing and t ere ore declme to ru e on the egality of 
Lopez's' arrest. Matter of Lopez[-}Mendoza, No. A22 452 
208 (INS Dec. 21, 1977), re~inted in Pet. for Cert. 97a. The 
Form I-213 and the affidavit executed by Lopez were re-
ceived into idence without objection from Lopez. On t he 
basis of this evidence the immigration JU ge found Lopez de-
portable. Lopez was granted the option of voluntary 
departure. 
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The BIA dismissed Lopez's appeal. It noted that "[t]he 
mere factOfanll ega arrest has no bearing on a subsequent 
deportation proceeding," In re Lopez-Mendoza, No. A22 452 
208 (BIA Sept. 19, 1979), reprinted in Pet. for Cert. 100a, 
102a, and observed that Lopez had not objected to the admis-
sion into evidence of Form I-213 and the affidavit he had exe-
cuted. I d., at 103a. The BIA also noted that the exclusion-
ary rule is not applied to redress the injury to the privacy of 
the search victim, and that the BIA had previously concluded 
that application of the rule in deportation proceedings to de-
ter unlawful INS conduct was inappropriate. Matter of 
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979). 
The Court of Appeals vacated the order of deportation and 
remanded for a determination whether Lopez's Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated when he was arrested. 
B 
Respondent Sandoval (who is not the same individual who 
was involved in Matter of Sandoval, supra) was arrested in 
1977 at his place of employment, a potato processing plant in 
Pasco, Washington. INS Agent Bower and other officers 
went to the plant, with the ermission of its ersonnel man-
agir, to check for illegal aliens. urmg a c ange m s ift offi-
cers stationed themselves at the exits while Bower and a_~­
formed Border Patrol a ent entered the plant. ey went 
to 11ielunc room and identified themse ves as immigration 
officers. Many people in the room rose and headed for the 
exits or milled around; others in the plant left their equip-
ment and started running; still others who were entering the 
plant turned aroun an started walking back out. The two 
officers eventually stationed themselves at the main entrance 
to the plant and looked for passing employees who averted 
their heads, avoided eye contact, or tried to hide themselves 
in a group. Those individuals were addressed with innocu-
ous questions in English. Ar:y who could not respond J.n 
English and who otherwise aroused AgenT Bower's suspi-
_.~ 
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cions were questioned in Spanish as to their right to be in the 
United States. 
Respondent Sandoval was in a line of workers entering the 
plant. Sandoval testified that he did not realize that immi-
gration officers were checking people entering the plant, but 
that he did see standing at the plant entrance a man in uni-
form who appeared to be a police officer. Agent Bower tes-
tified that it was probable that he, not his partner, had ques-
tioned Sandoval at the plant, but that he could not be 
absolutely positive. The employee he thought he remem-
bered as Sandoval had been "very evasive," had averted his 
head, turned around, and walked away when he saw Agent 
Bower. App. 137, 138. Bower was certain that no one was 
questioned about his status unless his actions had given the 
agents reason to believe that he was an undocumented alien. 
Thirty-seven employees, including Sandoval, were briefly ~ 7 ~1-41 
det~ and then taken to the count~ jail. 
About one-third immediately availed themselves of the op- 1 2. ~ 
tion of voluntary departure and were put on a bus to Mexico. k 
Sandoval exercised his right to a deportation hearing . .,L.-z:> ~~ J 
Sandoval was then questioned.iurther, and Agent Bower re- ~ 
corded Sandova s a InlSSion o unlawful entry. Sandoval ,., . L.-L 
1 
k 
contends he was not aware a e ad a right to remain si-~
lent. .&,pparently all 37 arrestees were subsequently deteP<---~ ~ 
..miaea te be illegally pteseat iu this country. ...r 
At his deportation hearing Sandoval contended that the ev-
idence offered by the INS should be suppressed as the fruit of 
an unlawful arrest. The immigration judge considered and 
rejected Sandoval's claim that he had been illegally arrested, 
but ruled in the alternative that the legality of the arrest was 
not relevant to the deportation hearing. Matter of 
Sandoval-Sanchez, No. A22 346 925 (INS Oct. 7, 1977), re-
printed in Pet. for Cert. at 104a. Based on the written J 
record of Sandoval's admissions the immigration judge found 
him deportable and granted him voluntary departure. The 
BIA dismissed Sandoval's appeal. In re Sandoval-Sanchez, 
I , '·~ 
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No. A22 346 925 (BIA Feb. 21, 1980). It concluded that the 
circumstances of the arrest had not affected the voluntariness 
of his recorded admission, and again declined to invoke the 
exclusionary rule, relying on its earlier decision in Matter of 
Sandoval, supra. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals concluded that Sandoval's 
detention by the immigration officers violated the Fourth 
Amendment, that the statements he made were a product of 
that detention, and that the exclusionary rule barred their 
use in a deportation hearing. The deportation order against 
Sandoval was accordingly reversed. 
II 
A deportation proceeding is a tfurely c~ to deter-
mine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an un-
lawful entry, though entering or remaining unlaWfully in this 
country is itself a crime. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1302, 1306, 1325. 
The deportation ~aring looks p_!ospe£1jvely, to the resQond-
ent's right to remain in 1llls count in the future. Past con-
duct is re evant only msofar as it may shed light on the re-
spondent's right to remain. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251, 1252(b); 
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591 (1913); Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730 (1893). 
A deportation hearing is held before an immigration judge. ~ 
The judge's sole power is to order deportation; t~e judge ~n- \)_,JL . . _ --;.,w 
not a~t or punish the res ondent for any crime /~ 1_ 
re a e o un a 1 entry into or presence in this country. ~ 
Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various ~
protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not 
apply in a deportation hearing. The respondent must be 
given "a reasonable opportunity to be present at [the] pro-
ceeding," but if the respondent fails to avail himself of that 
opportunity the hearing may proceed in his absence. 8 
U. S. C. § 1252(b). In many deportation cases the INS must 
show only identity and alienage; the burden then shifts to the 
respondent to prove the time, place and manner of his entry. 
~~ 
~~r 
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See 8 U. S. C. § 1361; Matter of Sandoval, supra. A deci-
sion of deportability need be based onl on "reaso!!,3b~­
stan 1a, and pro a 1ve evi ence," 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4). 
The-ETA or 1~quired only "clear, unequivocal 
and convincing" evidence of the respondent's deportability, 
not~asonable doubt. 8 CFR §242.14(a). 
The Courts of Appea s ave e d, for example that the ab-
sence of Miranda warnings does not render an otherwise vol-
untary statement by the respondent inadmissible in a de-
. n case. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F. 2d 803, 808 
77); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F. 2d 666, 667~ 
), Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F. 2d 397, 399-401(JQ_AV 
1975). See also Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 
236--237 (1960) (search pe~ted incidental to an arrest pur-
suant to an administrative warrant issued by the INS); 
Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 531 (1954) (ex post facto 
Clause has no application to deportation); Carlson v. Lan-
don, 342 U. S. 524, 544-546 (1952) (Eighth Amendment does 
not require bail to be granted in certain deportation cases); 
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 157 
(1923) (involuntary confessions admissible at deportation 
hearing). In short, a aeporta'fionnearing is mtended to pro-
viae a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in 
this country, nothing more. Although deportation undoubt-
e~ "visits....,_.a great hardship" on the person deported, 
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 154 (1945), the purpose of 
deportation is not to punish past transgressions but rather to 
put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws. 
III 
~J:J""-""'-L ~ The "body'' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a 
'r. -r--c 7 crimmal or civil proceeiling is never 1~elf suppressible as a 
~ ~ tiQ fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if ifTs conceaeaUia£ an un-
lawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred. See 
~ ~~Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Col-
/ __ L lins, 342 U. S. 519, 522 (1952); United $tates ex rel. 
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"lo msky_ v. Tod, supra, at 158. A similar rule applies in 
orfeit~oceedin s directed a~ontra and or forfeit-
able property. ee, e. g., United States v. Eighty-Eight 
Thousana: Five Hundred Dollars, 671 F. 2d 293 (CA8 1982); 
United States v. One (1) 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 
508 F. 2d 351 (CA9 1974); United States v. One 1965 Buick, 
397 F. 2d 782 (CA6 1968). 
On this basis alone the Court of Appealsldecision as tore- ~ 
spondent Lopez must be reversed. At his deportation hear-
ing Lopez objected onl to the fact that he had been sum-
mone to a eportation earing o oWing an un a arrest; 
h~ en er no ~ec;, Ion tot e eVI ence o ered agrunst him. 
The BIA correctfy ruled that "[t]he mere fact of an illegal ar-
rest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceed-
ing."1 In re Lopez-Mendoza, supra, reprinted in Pet. for 
Cert. 102a. 
IV 
Respondent Sandoval has a more substantial claim. He 
ob.ifuted not to his compelled presence at a deportation pro-
cee mg, but to evidence offered at that proceeding. The 
general rule in a criminal proceeding is that statements and 
other evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful, warrant-
less arrest are suppressible if the link between the evidence 
and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated. Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). The reach of the ex-
clusionary rule beyond the context of a criminal prosecution, 
1 The Court of Appeals brushed over Lopez's failure to object to the evi-
dence in an apparently unsettled footnote of its decision. The Court of Ap-
peals was initially of the view that a motion to terminate a proceeding on 
the ground that the arrest of the respondent was unlawful is, "for all prac-
tical purposes," the same as a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an 
unlawful arrest. Slip opinion, at 1765, n. 1 (Apr. 25, 1983). In the bound 
report of its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals takes a somewhat dif-
ferent view, stating in a revised version of the same footnote that "the only 
reasonable way to interpret the motion to terminate is as one that includes 
both a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss." 705 F. 2d 1059, 1060, 
n. 1 (1983). 
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~~~ less clear. Although this Court has once stated 
t at "[i]t may be assumed that evidence obtained ______ _ .,--
by t e abor] Department through an illegal search and sei-
zure cannot be made the basis of a finding in deportation pro-
ceedings," United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra, 
at 155, the Court has never squarely addressed the question 
before. Lower court decisions dealing with this question are 
sparse. 2 ~ 
In United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), this Court t7 
set forth a framework furdecidin in what t es of~roc;ed-
ing application of the exclusionary rule is a propriate. Im-
precise as e exercise may be, the Court recognized in Janis 
that there is no choice but to weigh the ~ely social benefits 
of ~xcluding:_ U!J.la eized evidence against the likely 
costs. On the enefit Sl oftiiel)alance "the '~rime pur- , ~ 
pose' of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, -1.s to deter '-:/ L-c..- j--D 
future unlawful police conduct."' Id., at 446, citing United 
States v. Calaiulra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). On the cost '~ ~ 
~there is the loss of often probative evidence and all off11e 
secondary costs that flow from the less accurate or more cum-
bersome adjudication that therefore occurs. 
At stake in Jan is was application of the exclusionary rule 
in a federal civil tax assessment proceeding following the un-
lawful seizure o ev1 ence y state, not federal, officials. 
The Court noted at the outset that "[i]n the complex and tur- (_ ~ 
bulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to ) {) __  
exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state." 
428 U. S., at 447 (footnote omitted). Two factors in Janis 
2 In United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 <D(Vt. 1899), a dis- I) 
trict judge excluded letters seized from the appellant in a civil deportation 
proceeding. In Ex Parte Jackson, 263 F. 110 (D_(Mont.), appeal dismissed f> 
sub nom. Andrews v. Jackson, 267 F. 1022 (CA9 1920), another district 
judge granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that papers and pam-
phlets used against the habeas petitioner in a deportation proceeding had 
been unlawfully seized. Wong Chung Che v. INS, 565 F. 2d 166 (CAl 
1977), held that papers obtained by INS agents in an unlawful search are 
inadmissible in deportation proceedings. 
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suggested that the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule 
in the context of that case was slight. First, the state law 
enforcement officials were already "punished" by the exclu-
sion of the evidence in the state criminal trial as a result of 
the same conduct. I d., at 448. Second, the evidence was 
also excludable in any federal criminal trial that might be 
held. Both factors suggested that further application of the 
exclusionary rule in the federal civil proceeding would con-
tribute little more to the deterrence of unlawful conduct by 
state officials. On the cost side of the balance, Janis focuse~ 
simply on the loss of "concededly relevant and reliable evi- ~~ 
dence." !d., at 447. The Court concluded that, on balance, tJ ~~ 
this cost outweighed the likely social benefits achievable 
through application of the exclusionary rule in the federal 
civil proceeding. 
While it seems likely that the deterrence value of applying 
the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings would be 
higher than it was in Janis, it is also quite clear that the~ 
cial costs would be very much greater as well. Applying the 
J anfs balancing test to the benefits and costs of excluding 
concededly reliable evidence from a deportation proceeding, 
we therefore reach the same conclusion as~ in Janis. .J--
The likely deterrence value of the exclusionary rule in de-
portation procee ings 1s difficult to assess. On the one 
hand, a civil deportation procee mg 1s a civil complement to a 
possible criminal prosecution, and to this extent it resembles 
the civil proceeding under review in Janis. The INS does 
not suggest that the exclusion;u-y rule ~ to 
ap~ ~ocee m s against an alien who unlawfully 
enters or remruns m t is country, ndtne prospect of losing 
evidence that might otherwise be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion undoubtedly supplies some residual deterrent to unlaw- ~ 
ful conduct by INS officials. But it must be acknowledged 
that only a very small percentage of arrests of aliens are in-
tended or expected to lead to criminal prosecutions. Thus 
the arresting officer's primary objective, in practice, will be 
83-491-0PINION 
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to use evidence in the civil deportation proceeding. More-
over, here, in contrast to Janis, the agency officials who ef-
fect the unlawful arrest are the same officials who subse-
quently bring the deportation action. As recognized in 
Janis, the exclusionary rule is likely to be most effective 
when applied to such "intrasovereign" violations. 
Nonetheless, several other factors significantly reduce the 
likely deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in a civil de-
portation proceeding. First, regardless of how the arrest is 
effected, deportation will still be possible when evidence not 
derived direct from the arrest is s c1ent to su ort de-
portation. As e as re e , many deportation 
proceedings "the sole matters necessary for the Government 
to establish are the respondent's identity and alienage-at 
which point the burden shifts to the respondent to prove the 
time, place and manner of entry." Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. 
& N. Dec., at 79. Since the person and identity of the re-
spondent are not themselves suppressible, see supra, at 
--ll, the INS must prove only alienage, and that will some-
times be possible using evidence gathered independently of, 
or sufficiently attenuated from, the original arrest. See 
Matter of Sandoval, supra, at 79; seete. g., Avila-Gallegos v. 1\. 
INS, 525 F. 2d 666 (CA2 1975). The INS's task is simplified J 
in this regard by the civil nature of the proceeding. As Jus-
tice Brandeis stated: "Silence is often evidence of the most 
persuasive character .... [T]here is no rule of law which pro-
hibits officers charged with the administration of the immi-
gration law from drawing an inference from silence of one 
who is called upon to spea . . . . person es d on the 
preliminary warrant is not protected by a presumption of citi-
zenship comparable to the presumption of innocence in a 
criminal case. There is no provision which forbids drawing ~ 
an adverse inference from the fact of standing mute." 
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S., at 
153-154. 
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The second factor is a ractical one. In the course of a 
year the /a~erage INS agen arrests almost 500 illegal aliens. 
Brief or e 1tioner 38. Over 97.5% apparently agree to vol-
untary deportation without a formal hearing. 705 F. 2d, at 
1071, n. 17. Among the remainder who do request a formal 
hearing (apparently a dozen or so in all, per officer, per year) 
very few challenge the circumstances of their arrests. As 
noted by the Court of Appeals, "the BIA was able to find only 
two reported immigration cases sfnce 1899'in which the Tex-
clusionary] rule was app e to bar unlawful y seiZe evi-
dence, on~ch the rule's application was 
specifically addressed, and fewer than fifty BIA proceedings 
since 1952 in which a Fourth Amendment challenge to the in-
troduction of evidence was even raised." I d., at 1071. 
Every BIA agent knows, therefore, that it is highly unlikely 
that any particular arrestee will end Ufl challenging the law-
fulness of his arrest in a formal deportation proceeding. 
When an occasional challenge is brought, the consequences 
from the point of view of the officer's overall arrest and de-
portation record will be trivial. In these circumstances, the 
arresting officer is most unlikely to shape his conduct in 
anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a formal deporta-
tion hearing. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the INS has its own, 
comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment vi-
olations by its officers. Most arrests of illegal aliens away 
from the border occur dunn:-~, or ot er work-
place surveys. Large numbers of illegafaliens are often ar-
rested a one time, and conditions are understandably cha-
otic. See Brief for Petitioner in INS v. Delgado, 0. T. 1983, 
No. 82-1271, pp. 3-5. To safeguard the rights of those who 
are lawfully present at inspected workplaces the INS has dej 
veloped rules restricting stop, interrogation, and arrest prac 
tices. Id., at 7, n. 7, 32-40, and n. 25. These regulation 
require that no one be detained without reasonable suspicion 
of illegal alienage, and that no one be arrested_ unless there is 
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an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence 
thereof. New immigration officers receive instruction and 
examination in Fourth Amendment law, and others receive 
periodic refresher courses in law. Brief for Petitioner 39-40. 
Evidence seized through intentionally unlawful conduct is ex-
cluded by Department of Justice policy from the proceeding 
for which it was obtained. See Memorandum from Benjamin 
R. Civiletti to Heads of Offices, Boards, Bureaus and Divi-
sions, Violations of Search and Seizure Law (Jan. 16, 1981). 
The INS also has in place a procedure for investigating and 
punishing immigration officers who commit Fourth Amend-
ment violations. See INS, U. S. Dep't of Justice, The Law 
of Arrest, Search, and Seizure for Immigration Officers 35 
(Rev. Jan. 1983). 
Finally, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in de-
portation proceedings is ~ed by the availability of al-
ternative remedies for institutional practices by the INS that 
might violate Fourth Amendment rights. The INS is a sin-
gle agency, under central federal control, and engaged in op-
erations of broad scope but highly repetitive chartJ,cter. The 
possibilit of Meclaratory relief a ainst the agency thus offers 
a pot;illtit':.· a.,ll;::y:--e~e~c~Iv~e~m!=::e~a==ns ~o~c:;:;;:;:::aFFe~n~gi~n~g~~e validity of 
INS practices. Cf. INS v. Delgado,-- U.S.-- (1984). 
In addition, actions for constitutional torts remain o en to 
those sub· ect to unlawful sea hes and seizures. See Btvens 
v. Six Un nown . Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 
(1971). 
Petitioners argue that retention of the exclusionary rule is 
necessary to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of eth-
nic Americans, particularly the Hispanic-Americans lawfully 
in this country. We recognize that petitioners raise here le-
gitimate and important concerns. But application of the ex-
clusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings can be justi-
fied only if the rule is likely to add significant protection to 
these Fourth Amendment rights. The exclusionary rule 
provides no remedy for completed wrongs; those lawfully in 
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this country can be interested in its application only insofar 
as it may serve as an effective deterrent to future INS mis-
conduct. For the reasons we have discussed we conclude 
that application of the rule in INS civil deportation proceed-
ings, as in the circumstances discussed in Janis, "is unlikely 
to provide significant, much less substantial, additional de-
terrence." 428 U. S., at 458. Important as it is to protect 
the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, there is no con-
vincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in 
civil deportation proceedings will contribute materially to 
that end. 
On the other side of the scale, the social costs of applying 
the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings are both un-
usual and significant. The first cost is one that is unique to 
continuing violations of the law. Applying the exclusionary 
rule in proceedings that are intended not to punish past 
transgressions but to prevent their continuance or renewal 
would require the courts to close their eyes to ongoing viola-
tions of the law. This Court has never before accepted costs 
of this character in applying the exclusionary rule. 
Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule 
should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering correc-
tive action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence 
underlying the order had been improperly obtained, or to 
compel police to return contraband explosives or drugs to 
their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized. 
On the rare occasions that it has considered costs of this type 
the Court has firmly indicated that the exclusionary rule does 
not extend this far. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 
48, 54 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 710 
(1948). The rationale for these holdings is not difficult to 
find. "Both Trupiano and Jeffers concerned objects the pos-
session of which, without more, constitutes a crime. The re-
possession of such per se contraband by Jeffers and Trupiano 
would have subjected them to criminal penalties. The re-
turn of the contraband would clearly have frustrated the ex-
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press public policy against the possession of such objects." 
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693, 
699 (1965) (footnote omitted). Precisely the same can be 
said here. Sandoval is a person whose unregistered pres-
ence in this country, without more, constitutes a crime. His 
release within our borders would immediately subject him to 
criminal penalties. His release would clearly frustrate the 
express public policy against an alien's unregistered presence 
in this country. Even the objective of deterring Fourth 
Amendment violations should not require such a result. The 
constable's blunder may allow the criminal to go free, but we 
have never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue 
in the commission of an ongoing crime. When the crime in 
question involves unlawful presence in this country, the crim-
inal may go free, but he should not go free within our 
borders. 3 
Other .factors also weigh against applying the exclusionary 
rule in deportation. proceedings. The BIA currently oper-
ates a deliberately simple deportation hearing system, 
streamlined to permit the quick resolution of very large num-
bers of deportation actions, and it is against this backdrop 
that the costs of the exclusionary must be assessed. The av-
erage immigration judge handles about 6 deportation hear-
ings per day. Brief for Petitioner 27 n. 16. Neither the 
hearing officers nor the attorneys participating in those hear-
ings are likely to be well-versed in the intricacies of Fourth 
Amendment law. The prospect of even occasional invocation 
of the exclusionary rule might significantly change and com-
3Similarly, in Sure-Tan, Inc . v. NLRB,- U.S.- (1984), W&con- +~ ~ c!.c tJ I( 1-
cluded that an employer can be guilty of an unfair labor practice in his deal-
ings with an alien notwithstanding the alien's illegal presence in this coun-
try. Retrospective sanctions against the employer may accordingly be 
imposed by the NLRB to further the public policy against unfair labor 
practices. But while he maintains the status of an illegal alien, the em-
ployee is plainly not entitled to the prospective relief-reinstatement and 
continued employment-that probably would be granted to other victims of 
similar unfair labor practices. 
fi • 
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plicate the character of these proceedings. The BIA has de-
scribed the practical problems as follows: 
"Absent the applicability of the exclusionary rule, ques-
tions relating to deportability routinely involve simple 
factual allegations and matters of proof. When Fourth 
Amendment issues are raised at deportation hearings, 
the result is a diversion of attention from the main issues 
which those proceedings were created to resolve, both in 
terms of the expertise of the administrative decision 
makers and of the structure of the forum to accommo-
date inquiries into search and seizure questions. The 
result frequently seems to be a long, confused record in 
which the issues are not clearly defined and in which 
there is voluminous testimony . . . . The ensuing delays 
and inordinate amount of time spent on such cases at all 
levels has an adverse impact on the effective administra-
tion of the immigration laws . . . . This is particularly 
true in a proceeding where delay may be the only 'de-
fense' available and where problems already exist with 
the use of dilatory tactics." Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & 
N., at 80 (footnote omitted). 
This sober assessment of the exclusionary rule's likely costs, 
by the agency that would have to administer the rule in at 
least the administrative tiers of its application, cannot be 
brushed off lightly. 
The BIA's concerns are reinforced by the staggering di-
mension of the problem that the INS confronts. Immigra-
tion officers apprehend over one million deportable aliens in 
this country every year. I d., at 85. A single agent may ar-
rest many illegal aliens every day. Although the investiga-
tory burden does not justify the commission of constitutional 
violations, the officers cannot be expected to compile elabo-
rate, contemporaneous, written reports detailing the circum-
stances of every arrest. At present an officer simply com-
pletes a "Record of Deportable Alien" that is introduced to 
prove the INS's case at the deportation hearing; the officer 
. . 
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rarely must attend the hearing. Fourth Amendment sup-
pression hearings would undoubtedly require considerably 
more, and the likely burden on the administration of the im-
migration laws would be correspondingly severe. 
Finally, the INS advances the credible argument that ap-
plying the exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings 
might well result in the suppression of large amounts on in-
formation that had been obtained entirely lawfully. INS ar-
rests occur in crowded and confused circumstances. Though 
the INS agents are instructed to follow procedures that ade-
quately protect Fourth Amendment interests, agents will 
usually be able to testify only to the fact that they followed 
INS rules. The demand for a precise account of exactly 
what happened in each particular arre.st would plainly pre-
clude mass arrests, even when the INS is confronted, as it 
often is, with massed numbers of ascertainably illegal aliens. 
In these circumstances we are persuaded that the Jan is 
balance between costs and benefits comes out against apply-
ing the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings held by 
the INS. By all appearances the INS has already taken sen-
sible and reasonable steps to deter Fourth Amendment viola-
tions by its officers, and this makes the likely additional de-
terrent value of the exclusionary rule small. The costs of 
applying the exclusionary rule in the context of civil deporta-
tion hearings are high. In particular, application of the ex-
clusionary rule in cases such as Sandoval's, would compel the 
courts to release from custody persons who would then im-
mediately resume their commission of a crime through their 
continuing, unlawful presence in this country. "There comes 
a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to adminis-
ter the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforce-
ment in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the 
duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches." United 
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We do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment that may have occurred in the arrests of respondents 
Lopez or Sandoval. Moreover, no challenge is raised here to 
the INS's own internal regulations. Cf. INS v. Delgado, 
-- U. S. -- (1984). These regulations might be vulner-
able, and indeed our conclusions concerning the exclusionary 
rule's value might change, if there developed good reason to 
believe that Fourth. Amendment violations by INS officers 
were widespread. Cf . . United States v. Leon, -- U. S. 
-- (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). Finally, we do not deal 
here w1th egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or 
other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence 
obtained} .Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). 
At issue here is the exclusion of credible evidence gathered in 
connection with peaceful arrests by INS officers. We hold 
that evidence derived from such arrests need not be sup-
pressed in an INS civil deportation hearing. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
Reversed 
•we note that subsequent to its decision in Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & 
N. 70 (1979), the BIA held that evidence will be excluded if the circum-
stances surrounding a particular arrest and interrogation would render use 
of the evidence obtained thereby "fundamentally unfair" and in violation of 
due process requirements of the fifth amendment. Matter of Toro, 17 I. 
&. N. Dec. 340, 343 (BIA 1980). See also Matter of Garcia, 17 I. & N. 
Dec. 319, 321 (BIA 1980) (suppression of admission of alienage obtained 
after request for counsel had been repeatedly refused); In re Ramira-Cor-
dova, No. A21 095 659 (BIA Feb. 21, 1980) (suppression of evidence ob-
tained as a result of a night-time warrantless entry into the aliens' 
residence). 
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